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COMBATTING SYSTEM-LEVEL QUALITY PROBLEMS IN COMPLEX 
PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT – DANIEL E WHITNEY, MIT JULY 2003 – 
MATERIAL SPECIFIC TO THE SUPPORTING COMPANIES HAS BEEN 
OMITTED 
Summary 
As products become more complex and their development involves more 
technologies, people, and companies, it is no longer sufficient to ensure that each 
part, component, or subsystem is designed and made correctly.  Problems that 
involve many distinct elements can still arise, even if each is designed according 
to the specifications.  Practitioners speak of Murphy’s Law and “sneak paths,” 
while academics refer to “emergent properties” and “undocumented 
interactions.”  The goal of this project is to look at this problem from the outside, 
focusing on Ford and two non-competing companies whose products are also 
complex: United Technologies and Boeing.  Interviews were conducted with 
senior management and lower level supervisors, focusing on both official 
processes and anecdotal reports on what works and what does not.  In addition, 
the academic literature on “system accidents” was consulted to see if there are 
insights that can be transferred.  The focus of the study was on quality problems 
introduced during product development, not during manufacturing. 
Interviewees at the companies agree that there is no sure fire remedy for 
system accidents or system level product quality problems.  They also agree on 
some of the causes, in addition to growing product and process complexity.  
Among these are organizational instability, the threat to informal networks of 
experts posed by rapid personnel transfers, growing specialization in technical 
fields, the trend toward outsourcing, and a shortage of people who are sensitive 
to system problems.  At Pratt&Whitney Aircraft Engines, more “design escapes” 
were caused by failure to follow existing procedures than to any other cause.  At 
Ford, a habit of designing from scratch seems to provide opportunities for 
surprises, while at Toyota adherence to standardized designs or processes 
gradually eliminates surprises over time.  At Boeing, the FAA certifies 
procedures and supervises adherence to them, encouraging learning over time.  
Nevertheless, at Boeing, Pratt, UTC Fuel Cells, and Otis Elevator, systems have 
so many possible internal states that some new ones are inevitably found during 
operation.  Ford, unlike Boeing and Otis, has the opportunity to test many 
production-ready prototypes, but Boeing, Ford, and Otis all sell customized 
systems that represent new combinations of components or environments, 
providing new opportunities for emergent properties. 
Social scientists have identified and studied system accidents for over 25 
years, stressing the interactions between individuals and both their organizations 
and the technologies they have to manage.  Events investigated include capsized 
offshore oil platforms and ferries, chemical plant explosions, ship collisions, and 
errors in hospitals.   Most researchers agree that it is incorrect to blame an 
individual for an accident even if he or she made an obvious mistake.  Many 
immediate and distant factors combine to cause these accidents, and most factors 
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are found to be deep-seated and of long duration. No deep study of product 
quality problems stemming from system interactions at the 
cultural/technological interface was found during this project, but the author 
suspects that system accident research can help product development avoid 
system quality problems. 
Social scientists have developed a number of useful lenses through which to 
view these problems.  “Creeping toward the edge” describes an organization that 
allows its procedures or standards to deteriorate because “we have not had any 
problems so far.”  Another lens is “problems waiting to happen.”  The particular 
problem that occurs is not in itself as important as the fact that the organization 
harbors a lot of them, and one was precipitated by an otherwise innocuous 
“trigger.”  Yet another lens is “a culture of diminished expectations,” as in “no 
project in memory has made that milestone on time, so what’s so bad about our 
project being late?” 
These theorists are of two minds concerning what can be done.  One school 
says that systems will inevitably become more complex and we have to expect 
problems to continue.  Problems in some kinds of systems, like nuclear power 
plants, are potentially so bad that such systems should just be banned.  Another 
school has identified “high reliability organizations” like air traffic control 
centers and nuclear powered aircraft carriers, and studied them to see how they 
avoid accidents. 
Within the organizational and managerial community, there are also two 
schools of thought.  One stresses process discipline and rigid adherence to 
standards, while the other moderates process discipline with openness and 
individual initiative, especially when something goes wrong.  No one 
recommends abandoning procedures, but some stress a single approach in all 
circumstances while others observe how some organizations rearrange 
themselves depending on their situation, behaving in a standardized hierarchical 
way under normal conditions while improvising and substituting expertise for 
rank when emergencies arise. 
The most sophisticated concept found during this project is “collective 
mindfulness.”  While this property has been identified in high reliability 
organizations, it is probably transferable to product development.  It involves 
everyone being aware that problems are possible and being on the lookout for 
them, even if they occur in someone else’s territory.  Members of such 
organizations know that their lives are on the line and that no one will reject a 
life-saving gesture.  Mutual trust and respect are basic to such behavior, as is 
plenty of training.  Top-down organization, assigned roles, and frequent 
communication act to reduce the likelihood of problems, while group awareness 
and initiative at low levels act to suppress the ones that occur. 
Project Motivation and Approach 
This project came out of discussions between the author and Chris Magee, 
then the Executive Director of the Ford-MIT Research Alliance.  The goal was to 
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identify work that would read directly on the mission of the Product 
Development Process Technology program within the Ford-MIT Research 
Alliance: how do we improve the quality of the product as well as the quality 
(i.e. efficiency and effectiveness) of the product development process?  The 
author conducted an outsider’s survey of Knowledge-Based Engineering (KBE) 
for Ford in 1998.  This survey consisted of a literature search and interviews at 
Ford, Boeing, United Technologies, Kodak, and Xerox.  The same approach was 
adopted for the current study. 
Out of all the possible problems that can occur during product 
development, probably the most elusive is the system problem.  The author’s 
discussion with Dr Magee occurred in the months following the emergence of 
the Ford Explorer-Firestone Tire problem, so the issue was on many people’s 
minds.  The author knows Ford very well and has heard Ford people say things 
like “we are part-centric.”  While focusing on parts is necessary, as is assigning 
responsibility for parts to individual people, one cannot lose sight of interactions 
between parts or fail to assign people to look out for them.  
The author’s field of expertise is mechanical assemblies.  His research is 
both technical and managerial.  Assemblies are inherently integrative, and 
studying how they are designed reveals many gaps in education and practice 
between the lavish attention given to individual parts and the relative neglect 
accorded to assemblies of those parts.  A manager at another car company said 
“The customer looks at the gap between the door and the body, but that’s an 
empty space.  We assign people to manage metal, not empty space.” 
In addition to current events and company habits, a motivation to look at 
system problems arose from the formation at MIT of the Engineering Systems 
Division (ESD).  The ESD focuses on systems and has attracted people who are 
interested in them, including the author and Dr Magee.  Among the complex 
systems that ESD has chosen to focus on is the product development process. 
Just as the project was getting under way, ESD held an internal symposium 
in which all ESD faculty gave short talks describing their research.  Among them 
were two that seemed especially relevant.  One was by Nancy Leveson [Leveson] 
on how to write specifications for software (such as for air traffic control) that 
would prevent accidents.  Leveson put forth the concept of hazard analysis, a 
way of determining if a system is safe that is different from failure modes and 
effects analysis.  John Carroll [Carroll et al] described industrial accidents and 
embedded them in the concept of two-loop learning.  Single loop learning is 
sufficient to change the rules, while the second loop is necessary to embed new 
behavior in an organization.  The latter is similar in many ways to collective 
mindfulness.  The author benefited from exposure to these new ideas and 
decided to pursue them. 
Tracing citations in papers by Leveson and Carroll, the author was led to a 
large lode of papers by organizational and social scientists who seem to have 
targeted and chewed over system accidents for almost three decades, well out of 
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sight of researchers in product development.  Thus the goal of the project came 
to be to answer the questions: 
Are system-level design problems in complex products analogous to 
system accidents, and can the system accident literature help us understand 
why product system design problems occur and how to prevent or mitigate 
them? 
What do product development professionals think?  Are system-level 
quality problems prevalent and important?  What do they think the causes and 
remedies are?  What is their opinion of the academic theories?  What methods 
do their companies use now to avoid system level quality problems? 
What The Academic Literature Says 
The author looked at two academic literatures, system accidents within the 
larger literature of social and organizational science, and product development, 
especially in the auto industry.   In addition, he consulted the system engineering 
literature. 
System Accident Research 
System accident research appears to have emerged from ergonomics and 
individual man-machine research.   Psychologists look at the individual while 
social scientists look at systems of individuals.  Social scientists assume that 
industrial activity occurs within an organization, which in turn forces a number 
of the behaviors that occur.  The technologies that people deal with are also very 
influential, and there is plenty of debate about whether organizations shape 
technologies or vice versa. [Thomas] 
This domain is relevant to product development for several reasons.  
Systems where accidents occur are complex and are operated by many people 
individually or in teams.   They have different technical backgrounds and work 
in different functional departments or companies.  Product development 
similarly requires defining and understanding complex systems and involves 
many people from many different departments and companies.  The system 
complexities in both domains make it possible for unexpected interactions to 
occur.  Managers in both domains therefore face similar problems, as do the 
individual engineers. 
System accident research identifies at least four ways to look at an accident: 
[Reason, 2000] [Rasmussen] 
• The person theory, which says that a person can be found who caused 
the accident.  The response is to discipline that person and make his 
mistake known to others, so that it will not happen again.  Individual 
parts are made more robust to prevent a repetition.  This is also 
known as the “fatal flaw” theory. 
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• The chain of events theory, in which event A causes event B, which 
causes event C, etc., until event X causes the accident.   The response 
is to give next design more redundancy.  This is sometimes called the 
“want of a nail” or “domino” theory. 
• The “swiss cheese” theory, which says that a “perfect storm” of things 
combine in just the wrong way, causing the accident (the holes in 
different cheese slices line up just right).  People often hope that 
nothing like it will ever happen again.   
• The interacting events theory, in which the causative factors do not 
create a simple domino effect, but rather bounce causes and effects 
back and forth among each other in complex ways. 
• The accident waiting to happen theory, in which the causative events 
are the result of “inherent defects”1 in the organization; they do not 
need to have any relation to each other, but all of them are necessary 
or else the event would not have occurred.2 
Each of these views is increasingly sophisticated.   It is likely that most real 
accidents are mixtures of some or all of these.   But each is useful in its own right 
because it represents a possible mental model adopted by managers and 
members of organizations.  If you think accidents are caused by individuals who 
make mistakes, then you will overlook system accidents and their causes.  
Discussed in more detail later, this insight says that preventing different kinds of 
accidents requires different kinds of management intervention and 
organizational policies. 
System accidents are rare and for good reason: a lot of effort goes into 
preventing accidents of all kinds, and any accident with one or two contributing 
causes will be easier to anticipate and prevent than one that requires six or eight.  
So in reasonably well-designed systems, all the easy ones have been stopped 
already, leaving the hard ones. 
But it is a common mistake to calculate that multiple cause accidents are 
rare because the laws of probability make them so.  If the likelihood of a 
contributing cause is p and it takes n contributors to make the accident happen, 
then one might conclude that the probability of the accident is 
! 
p
n .  If p is a very 
modest 10% and n is 6, the likelihood of the accident is one in a million, right?  
Wrong.  This calculation assumes that each contributor is independent of the 
others.  If the person theory is correct (equivalent to being part-centric) then the 
causes might be independent.  But if the accident waiting to happen theory is 
                                                
1 In the medical mistake literature, these are called “resident pathogens.”  Like 
the inherent defects, they are there long before the particular accident happens. 
[Reason, 1990] 
2 [Chassin and Becher] describe a hospital error in which 13 doctors and nurses 
made 17 separate and apparently unrelated mistakes resulting in a patient 
receiving another patient’s procedure. 
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correct, then the individual causes, and the accident itself, are consequences of 
the culture in which they are embedded.  They have a common cause and thus 
are not independent. 
For example, the likelihood that an airline pilot will make a simple 
procedural error (like doing the checklist from memory instead of following the 
book) is fairly high, but it is unlikely to endanger the flight.  The likelihood that 
the pilot actually skips a step in the checklist is much less likely to happen but is 
more likely to endanger the flight.  Unfortunately, pilots who make the first kind 
of error are 40% more likely to commit the second and even more serious kinds 
of errors than pilots who do not.  So these apparently different causes of airline 
accidents are correlated, and predicting their likelihood by multiplying their 
individual probabilities leads to greatly underestimating the likelihood of a 
serious accident due to those causes acting together. [Helmreich] 
The airline industry is in fact relatively safe, and several reasons are cited.  
One is training.  Another is a non-punitive error-reporting system, such as 
accident investigations.  A third is government supervision of aircraft design, 
crew training and rest, and traffic control.  Within these systems lies an 
important habit, namely to look very hard at “near misses.”  (Norman Augustine 
said, “Cherish your anomalies.”3)  Actual accidents occur too rarely to present 
enough learning experiences, and no one wants accidents just so that learning 
can happen.  Covering up is therefore very dangerous, and this is why the 
industry pushes the concept of the non-punitive investigation. 
An important conclusion from airlines, found in other industries, is that a 
variety of measures is needed, combining top-down directed, standardized, 
enforced rule-driven behavior, plus encouragement of observation, looking in 
unusual places, being ready for the unexpected, being open in communication, 
providing training in teamwork and cooperation, and encouraging reporting of 
problems.  These are characteristics of what are called High Reliability 
Organizations, discussed below. 
Rasmussen stresses several paradoxes encountered on the way to a more 
sophisticated view of system accidents.  Each accident is a sample from a kind of 
snake pit of potential events, all of them similar in background cause but none of 
them identical.  If you define the cause in enough detail, it will almost certainly 
never happen exactly that way again.  Also, if you look for an abnormal event as 
the cause, you will overlook the frequent situation where an apparently normal 
event acts as the trigger.  This is especially true if the “culture of diminished 
expectations” is in effect, because the prevailing culture is by definition normal 
to its participants even if it is in fact defective.  Thus Rasmussen says that “the 
causal tree found by accident analysis is only a record of one past case, not a 
model of the involved relational structure.”  Very deep analysis is required to 
reveal this structure. 
                                                
3 “Simple Systems and Other Myths,” Brunel Lecture, MIT December 7, 2001. 
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According to [Weick, et al], high reliability organizations (HROs) such as air 
traffic control centers and nuclear powered air craft carriers share several 
organizational and managerial characteristics: 
1.  Preoccupation with failure.   HRO members know that problems are 
just below the surface, are rare, and give no warning.  So members 
are constantly on the lookout and pay attention to the smallest clues 
that something might be wrong.  “They act as if there is no such 
thing as a localized failure and suspect, instead, that causal chains 
that produced the failure are long and wind deep inside the system.”  
Failure includes any dysfunctional response to success, such as 
complacency. 
2. Reluctance to simplify interpretations.  “Organizations are defined by 
what they ignore.”   HROs socialize people to notice more.  They also 
cultivate “requisite variety,” meaning that they make sure that 
people with different backgrounds, assumptions, and experience are 
mixed together, providing adversarial reviews and checks and 
balances.4 
3. Sensitivity to operations.  People [in military situations] work hard to 
create a “cognitive map that allows them to integrate such diverse 
inputs as status, information sensors and remote observation, and 
real time performance of equipment.”  “People who are sensitive to 
operations see more interconnections.” 
4.  Commitment to resilience.  “HROs acknowledge the reality of fallible 
humans, murky technology, and narrow specialties.”  They pay 
attention to both error prevention and error containment.  When 
events get outside of normal operations, knowledgeable people self-
organize into ad hoc networks to provide expert problem solving. 
5. Underspecification of structures.  “Effective HROs loosen the 
designation of who is the important decision maker in order to allow 
decision making to migrate along with problems.”  Authority passes 
to those who know the most. 
In general, HROs are interesting because they have developed methods for 
dealing with unexpected events in complex systems.  They know that planning 
ahead will not cover everything that could happen.  They try to create a structure 
that combines discipline with improvisation so that surprises are not as 
surprising, so that sneak paths may get noticed before they cause trouble, so that 
the best minds address the problem, and so that response is fast and 
unencumbered by “efficient” but rigid decision processes.  In an efficient 
organization, processes are rigid but attitudes vary, in the sense that people 
constantly seek workarounds when the rigid processes do not work.  In an HRO, 
                                                
4 A Ford manager told the author “Good advice comes from unexpected places.” 
DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES ONLY 2/15/07 
 8 
attitudes are constant but processes vary.  The constant attitude is mindfulness, 
while the processes are allowed to restructure in response to the situation. 
HRO researchers point out that one block to HRO performance is over-
stretched people caused by downsizing and broken knowledge networks caused 
by outsourcing.  Another factor is compartmentalization and organizational 
loyalty, which prevent people from noticing problems that cross these 
boundaries.  These considerations apply to product development organizations 
as well.  
Much of the HRO culture of collective mindfulness is captured by the 
following quote.  It is the Captain of the US nuclear powered aircraft carrier 
Stennis ending his morning broadcast to the crew:  “Take care of yourselves, take 
care of your ship, take care of your shipmates.”5 
To achieve HRO performance requires facing some paradoxes in 
management, “providing some hierarchy but being willing to relax, combining 
rigidity and flexibility, confidence and wariness, anticipation and resilience.”  
“Reliability requires diversity, duplication, overlap, and a varied response 
repertoire, whereas efficiency requires homogeneity, specialization, non-
redundancy, and standardization.”   
Product Development Research 
The domain of product development research is too broad to cover in this 
report.  Here the focus will be on two areas:  One is specific field studies that look 
deeply into how Toyota manages product development, compared to two US car 
makers.  The other is a process mapping tool that seems well-suited to 
documenting system and subsystem interactions, called the Design Structure 
Matrix. 
Field Studies Comparing Toyota to US Car Makers by Sobek and 
Morgan 
Durward Sobek and James Morgan did PhD research on Toyota’s product 
development methods.  Toyota seems to be especially aware of system issues and 
takes particular steps to develop system skills in its people and organization.  
Sobek learned Japanese and spent 6 months in Toyota City interviewing people.  
He also spent considerable time at Chrysler.  At that time, (1996) Chrysler was 
wedded to its platform team concept, while Toyota was functionally oriented 
and reliant on the heavyweight program manager concept.6 [Clark and Fujimoto] 
Sobek emphasizes several aspects of Toyota’s product development 
methods that are relevant to this study.  First, Toyota cultivates deep technical 
                                                
5 From a CNN program about life aboard the Stennis during the Afgan conflict of 
2001. 
6 At Toyota, the term is Chief Engineer, who is responsible for the vehicle concept 
as well as all the system-level design. 
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expertise in both its managers and its engineers.  They are encouraged to learn 
about their own area plus how it relates to others.  Toyota’s engineers “are 
technical experts with a systems-level understanding of how they and their parts 
fit in the bigger picture.” People who are targeted as Chief Engineer material 
must demonstrate, over two 10-year evolutions, that they can learn the 
connections between things as well as in-depth understanding of two technical 
areas.  This creates people at the top of the product development organization 
who have and value “connection knowledge.”   
Second, Toyota uses a design method that academics call Set-Based Design.  
This involves developing to the level of prototypes several versions of certain 
subsystems, rather than setting one clear set of specifications early in the process.  
This method permits more debate about how to balance and trade off 
requirements among different subsystems.  “Paradoxically,” this delays 
decisions but can make better systems and cars.  [Ward, et al]  This practice 
acknowledges that one cannot write a complete specification and flow it down to 
subsystems, but instead must have some hardware or other essentially bottom-
up way of seeing if misfits occur before a final decision is made. 
Third, Toyota permits each design team some latitude in organizing itself 
and requires individual engineers to find the information they need (effectively a 
pull system for information).  “The pull strategy is aided by maximizing written 
communication and by minimizing meetings.” 
Fourth, emphasized more by Morgan, Toyota standardizes parts and 
processes.  This “maximizes learning and continuous improvement, speeds up 
the design process, and increases the reliability of designs.”  In fact, a lot of 
concurrent engineering is unnecessary because engineers and process designers 
already know what to expect. 
Morgan completed his PhD thesis at the University of Michigan, in July, 
2002.  It extends the thesis by Sobek and shares the same faculty supervisors. 
Morgan compares body engineering from clay modeling to completion of 
stamping dies at Toyota and a disguised US firm called North American 
Competitor (NAC).  Morgan pursues two main themes.  One of these is a three-
part framework consisting of “process,” “people,” and “tools.”  The other is 
“lean.”  Lean emerges in his emphasis on value stream mapping (VSM), derived 
from recent descriptive books by Smith and Reinertsen (1997) and Shook and 
Rother (1998).  [Womack and Jones] also recommend VSM. 
Morgan identifies the complexities of product development as 
• Parallel activities and work streams 
• Information interchange between the parallel streams (handoffs 
allow errors to enter the communication) 
• Diversity of functions, language, and incentives across the 
participating people, organizations, and companies 
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• Long durations of activities and the process as a whole 
• Queues, congestion, delays, errors, feedback, and rework 
He says that these factors distinguish product development from 
manufacturing.  In spite of this, the main theme of the thesis is that methods 
found successful in manufacturing can be successfully applied to product 
development, and that Toyota has done so.  Some of the techniques Toyota uses 
in product development seem to transfer directly, such as JIT applied to both 
information and people, identification and elimination of excess inventory 
(queues of work waiting to be done), and standardization of processes.  Not 
transferred is the idea of cross-trained people.  In fact, specialization and deep 
technical knowledge of a limited range of tasks is emphasized in product 
development.  People spend years doing the same job, and their deep technical 
knowledge, plus standardization, holds the system together. 
A summary of Toyota’s principles is as follows [Morgan, Chapter 1] 
1. A holistic systems approach to product development, integrating and 
aligning people, processes, and tools.  People are highly skilled and 
are rewarded for following the standard processes.  Processes are 
aligned to minimize waste.  Technology is “right-sized.”7 
2. Embedded customer-first attitude.  This begins when new hires do a 
turn at a dealership.  It supposedly helps align goals and incentives 
and resolves tradeoffs. 
3. A front loaded process.  In body engineering, this involves long 
discussions between teams of stylists, body engineers, and body 
manufacturing people to anticipate and eliminate manufacturing 
problems during clay model development. 
4. Built-in learning and continuous improvement.  This sounds similar 
to what is done in manufacturing but the methods are different.  
They include in-process and post mortem “reflection” events where 
problems are discussed by the product development team, and 
counter-measures are defined for next time. 
5. Synchronization of parallel processes for simultaneous execution.  
This is where VSM comes in.  It allows processes to be mapped, 
including information exchanges between parallel streams.  Process 
standardization helps here too because some tasks can begin with 
partial information since the receivers know pretty much what the 
suppliers of info will do next.   
                                                
7 In the PI’s own visits to Toyota in 1991 he noted small machine tools and simple 
computer analysis methods.  At NAC both trends are reversed.  Taka Fujimoto 
once told the author that Ford has more computer power than the entire 
Japanese car industry. 
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6. Rigorous standardization creates strategic flexibility.  Standard 
processes for design and manufacture of fairly standardized sheet 
metal parts removes most of the surprises from their design and 
analysis, die design, and die tryout.  When extra people are needed 
to handle surges in work, people from other body engineering 
groups or even affiliated companies can step in because the tasks are 
well known and practiced.  This is the flexibility referred to above.  
Standardization also includes reuse, common architecture, standard 
die design methods, and so on. 
7. “Go to the source” engineering.  This means that engineers and 
others get information first hand and do not depend on information 
handoffs.  They visit the dealerships and the plant, witness tests, and 
talk directly to other involved people. 
One particularly interesting Toyota process practice is the designation of a 
“Simultaneous Engineer” (SE) for each sheet metal part and subassembly.  This 
person is from manufacturing and is the mother hen of the part from clay 
modeling to production.  The SE is involved with every process step that 
impinges on the part.  He follows it from step to step and department to 
department.  In some sense he is the system engineer or system integrator, 
analogous to the medical internist who musters the necessary specialists for the 
patient.  It is significant that the SE is from the group that receives parts rather 
than from a group that generates part designs. 
From other sources the author has learned that Boeing has assigned 
engineers end-to-end responsibility for parts on a recent 777 aircraft program 
[Cutcher-Gershenfield et al] and that GM has defined a role called integration 
engineer.  When the author visited Toyota in 1991 they emphasized to him 
“continuing responsibility” on the part of engineers for their components later in 
the development and launch process. 
In summary, it appears that Toyota is rich in procedures and rewards 
people for following them.  We must be careful not to ignore the other aspects of 
Toyota that encourage connection thinking and cross-discipline or cross-time 
connections that link processes and organizations together. 
System Engineering Theory 
System Engineering Theory teaches designers to create a hierarchy of 
functions and physical objects.   Boeing calls the highest level requirements “Key 
Characteristics.”  Ford calls them “attributes.”  In most cases, these are system 
behaviors that are visible to the customer.  The requirements of upper levels in 
the hierarchy are decomposed and flowed down to the lower levels.  This is 
intended to create separate manageable pieces that can be worked on 
independently.  Carried to its extreme, this is called “reductionism.”  Major 
challenges include remembering all the requirements, keeping them consistent, 
and understanding the many interactions between branches of the hierarchy.  
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These interactions cause problems during integration at the end of product 
development and challenge the basic assumptions underlying reductionism. 
System engineering theory works most smoothly when the product can be 
broken into modules that are relatively independent.  Such products or systems 
are called modular.  When products cannot be decomposed simply, or when 
their behaviors interact, they are called integral.  [Ulrich and Eppinger]  As 
shown in Figure 1, some kinds of products are easier to modularize than others.  
More integral products need to be designed at the highest level of the hierarchy, 
or their design requires a lot of coordination of the “modules” at lower levels. 
 
Figure 1. Examples of Products with Different Degrees of Integrality.  As 
integrality increases, it is harder to divide the product into independent modules. 
(Illustration provided by Prof Jasper Steyn, University of Pretoria.) 
Interviews or Literature About System Engineering 
The top-down approach recommended by system engineering theory is a 
good guide to sound engineering practices.   However, it must be applied with 
caution, as the following interviews indicate. 
According to the theory of Axiomatic Design [Suh], the best design is one 
where each function is implemented in a way that is independent of 
implementation of any other function.  This permits the maximum in 
independence and simplicity.  It is impossible to define all of these relationships 
at once.  Instead, one has to start with the top-level functions and define some 
top-level technological choices or implementations.  These give rise to a second 
layer of functional requirements, which in turn are linked to more detailed or 
subordinate technical implementations.  This process continues in a zig-zag 
fashion to the lowest level in the hierarchy.  While there is general agreement 
that simpler designs with independent functions are desirable, there is less 
agreement about whether this is possible in complex systems. 
An SDM8 graduate working for high performance workstation 
manufacturer told the author the following story about outsourcing, often cited 
as a cause of system-level problems:  To combat falling margins, his company 
has outsourced more and more.  Subject-matter experts were laid off on the 
assumption that their detailed knowledge would be filled by the suppliers.  But 
customers want PC prices and high performance reliability, while the suppliers 
came from the PC culture and were unprepared for the company’s requirements.  
                                                
8 SDM means System Design and Management, a graduate professional program 
at MIT that trains students to understand systems. 
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Things that look modular and low-tech, like cabinet doors, become integral when 
attached to a computer that stresses hardware the way his company’s operating 
system does.  Processors run very hot and lots of electro-magnetic interference 
can be expected.  This affects cabinet design in many complex ways that the 
company understands (or understood) but suppliers do not. 
A U S Air Force Systems Command SDM graduate told the author that 
requirements seem to be emergent.  As the system is being designed, users begin 
to understand what its potential is and start to add requirements.  Also, 
constraints emerge as implementations are explored, and these add new 
requirements.  This is similar to Suh’s zig-zag model of engineering design. 
Carliss Baldwin and Kim Clark have studied modularity and conclude that 
there are three kinds: [Baldwin and Clark] 
• modularity in design – each function is designed separately and 
placed in one physical object, or several functions and their objects 
are combined and designed together 
• modularity in production – a group of functions or physical objects is 
built or bought as a package 
• modularity in use – the customer can combine several functions or 
physical objects and use them, choose them when buying, or 
upgrade them together 
The important thing to understand is that the three different kinds of 
modules may be different.  As illustrated in Figure 2, a module that exists in 
production may include parts of many modules that exist in design, causing 
confusion, cutting systems in two, and creating disconnected pieces of 
requirements that must be satisfied by different suppliers who may not have the 
skills.  The example in the figure was provided by Francois Fourcade, who was 
product line manager for a front-end module for a French car supplier.  Its 
customer cancelled the program and the supplier, seeing no way to make a profit 
in view of the technical and business complexities, has not bid on this kind of 
item since. [Fourcade] 
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Figure 2. A “Module in Production” Consisting of Front Bumper, Bolster, 
Grill, and Lights Contains Portions of Several Systems but Not All of Any 
One.  It is Easy to Install on the Car but Hard to Design and Test. 
Norman Augustine, past CEO of Lockheed-Martin says “No change is a 
small change.”  Sneak paths are always possible, and a change can include or 
create a new sneak path.  Constant awareness is the only answer.  Question 
everything: make sure at least one non-yes man is on the team.  Attention to 
detail increases your luck.  Treasure your anomalies.  Examine claims that the 
system is redundant: it may look that way on the print but not be in fact. 
According to a Pratt&Whitney Aircraft Engines SDM graduate, component 
and system simulations can predict a jet engine’s fuel consumption within about 
2% but that is not good enough to know for sure that contract performance will 
be reached.  Even separate tests on real components are not good enough due to 
strong coupling between them.   Only a complete engine test will reveal actual 
performance.  Engine manufacturers use results of engine tests to improve the 
accuracy of simulations for use on the next engine program.  The best way to 
improve an engine after this test is to coordinate design activities on several 
components rather than trying to further improve individual components.  
Design Structure Matrix Methods 
The Design Structure Matrix (DSM) is a method for documenting 
interactions.  The DSM can capture the sequence and relationships of design 
tasks or decisions, or the relationships between parts in a product, or relations 
between design parameters like diameter of a brake disk and pedal pressure.  
The DSM has been used successfully at Ford to streamline complex engineering 
processes as well as to align timing for exchange of information between many 
engineering teams. 
At Pratt&Whitney Aircraft Engines, two SDM students made a design 
parameter DSM of an engine to illustrate how parameter decisions propagate 
through the design.  The goal was to help predict the impact of strategic design 
decisions, such as how many rows of blades should be in the compressor.  Too 
few rows could cause compressor stall and backfires, while too many rows 
lengthen the engine.  Often a chain of 6 to 8 parameters intervenes between the 
first decision and the ultimate problem.  Only a few P&W employees have 
enough experience to be aware of the entire chain, but several of them can be 
found by inspecting this DSM.  Thus the DSM can be thought of as a place to 
store system-level information about how things interact. 
DSMs generally indicate that things are coupled.  The best that one can do is 
use the DSM to identify clusters of things that must be considered together, say 
by assigning a team to them or focusing a meeting on them.  It is unusual to find 
a design decoupled the way Prof Suh recommends. 
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Summary 
The common theme running through both technically-oriented and non-
technical research on product development, high reliability organizations, and 
system engineering is that unexpected or emergent behaviors are inevitable in 
complex systems.  Among the causes are  
• Action at a distance, or invisible actions 
• Technological immaturity 
• Domain crossing or linking (mechanical and electronics, for example) 
• Unsophisticated view of interfaces  
• Lack of oversight of system interactions 
• Time delay, or gradual growth of interactions 
• Human cognitive limits 
• Human agency, ingenuity, and gaming 
• Excessive reductionism, ignoring or trying to suppress interactions, or 
decomposing things that are integral or highly coupled 
Reading down this list takes us from fairly straight-forward technical 
complexities to very sophisticated problems associated with quite abstract forces.  
A common issue is complex interactions, equivalently the refusal of separate 
elements of a system to behave separately.  Design methods and design cultures 
must be attuned to these interactions and be prepared to counter them.  Both 
social science and product development research indicate that, while procedures 
and process discipline are necessary, they are insufficient.  Since systems do 
unscripted things, product developers and system operators must have some 
unscripted procedures available to them to help them respond. 
Interviews9 
MIT 
The author spoke personally to several MIT faculty members who offered 
the following comments and advice: 
Prof Nancy Leveson, Software Safety Expert:  In software systems, most of 
the failures occur in spite of the fact that the software functioned as it was 
intended to.  The cause of the failure is inadequate specifications.  She advocates 
an approach called “hazard analysis.”10  This method differs from FMEA, which 
requires identifying ways things could fail, which she calls “scenario analysis.”  
                                                
9 In general, interviewees are not identified in the interests of making the 
narrative flow.  In some cases, the names are given in order to provide context 
for their comments or to give credit for their intellectual contribution.  Some 
interviews were obtained in the course of general discussions about other topics 
and not specifically in connection with this project.  Only the interviews listed 
under MIT or company names in this report were part of this project, and all 
interviewees understood that. 
10 This is also called “outcomes analysis.” 
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In complex systems there are too many scenarios and you will never think of all 
of them.  Instead it is more efficient and effective to identify the hazards and 
make sure that the system prevents them.  In an air traffic control system, “two 
planes on a collision course” is a hazard.  The software assigning paths to aircraft 
must check that no new path creates a collision course.  This is different from 
trying to find all the ways that a collision course could come into being and then 
seeking to prevent each of these causes.  She also believes that the person/part 
theory and the chain of events theory are believed by most managers.  The 
response to the person theory is to fix the blame and try to design more robust 
parts.  The response to the chain of events theory is to add redundancy in the 
hope of breaking the chain.  But this can add complexity.  When the cause is due 
to a network of interactions or due to culture and organization, managers who 
believe in the simpler explanations are baffled to find that the components 
worked as they were supposed to. 
Prof John Carroll, Sloan School of Management, expert in organizational 
learning:  Managers who believe the person/part theory respond to an accident 
by clamping down on the guilty individual and enforcing the rules more 
stringently. 
Prof Paul Lagace, former co-Director of the SDM program and Prof of 
Aeronautics and Astronautics:  He is an expert in composite materials and a 
consultant to Boeing.  He says that Boeing Commercial Aircraft over-designs its 
structures more than Airbus does, but both are carefully supervised by the FAA 
and the European regulators.  Aircraft design is very conservative and verified 
by full size prototypes tested to destruction.  Design methods are standardized to 
“the Boeing way” and MIT graduates who work there sometimes get frustrated.  
Thanks in part to the influence of the LFM11 program and Boeing’s large cadre of 
LFM graduates, the company is strengthening its design-build team concept.  Yet 
aircraft are extremely complex and there is no way to predict everything that will 
happen.  His hope is that every LFM and SDM partner company will have a 
systems engineering department with real influence over the product 
development process. 
[Company-specific sections omitted.] 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
Complex products and systems are hard to design because a) they contain 
complex components, and b) because those components interact in complex and 
sometimes unpredictable ways.  There is a limit to the ability of design and 
management processes to anticipate all of these emergent system behaviors.  The 
ability of people to notice and discover these behaviors needs to be included in 
                                                
11 LFM means Leaders for Manufacturing, a professional program offered by MIT 
that leads to master’s degrees in engineering and management. 
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the way product development is managed.12  New attitudes and expectations are 
required, but new organizational structures may not be.   (In fact, none of the 
known structures (functional, program, matrix, etc.) have proven totally 
satisfactory or durable.)  Instead, the existing organizations need additional 
flexibility to accommodate some unscripted boundary crossing by people who 
know what to look for and are encouraged to do so.  Such unscripted activities 
mirror the unanticipated emergent system behaviors and are so far the only 
proven response to them.  This is the lesson from the High Reliability 
Organization research cited above.  “Unvarying procedures can’t handle what 
they didn’t anticipate.”  [Weick, et al]  Yet managers of complex product 
development activities seem to have an irresistible urge to add more checklists, 
health charts, and procedures in an attempt to rein in unpredictable problems. 
The contrasting approaches described above could be called “top-down” 
and “bottom-up.”  In various academic literatures, top-down is also called 
mechanistic, reductionist, and having the process perspective.  Correspondingly, 
the bottom-up approach is also called organic, wholistic, and taking the practice 
perspective.  The message from this study is that neither of these approaches can 
be counted on to suffice alone, but that top-down has been given more play and 
confidence, while bottom-up has not been given enough, except in special 
circumstances. 
It takes a long time for someone to learn all the interactions that are known, 
much less learn how to find the hidden ones.  Data from several lines of research 
indicate that individual attributes are supported by 6 to 12 underlying and 
interacting items, and sometimes more.  The interactions comprise long chains 
that can snake unrecognized through assemblies, tooling, internal organizations, 
and supply chains.  Only the most senior employees, given the chance, are likely 
to understand the whole chain in any given situation.  Management incentives 
and career path planning are needed to ensure that a critical mass, perhaps 10% 
of all technical employees, have a chance to develop this kind of knowledge and 
put it into use. 
In some cases, the required knowledge is so broad that one person will 
never have it all.  Instead it will be found shared among several people who have 
been allowed to work together for many years.  Often these people rotate the 
responsibilities among themselves so that each has some taste of every aspect of 
the system.  [Whitney] This is in sharp contrast to the notion that deep 
knowledge is always associated with individuals with experience in one domain. 
The challenge for traditional management, especially people brought up on 
success formulas like Lean or Re-engineering, is to trust their staff with more 
opportunities to find out for themselves what is going on.  Process discipline 
                                                
12 The author had a friend at IBM, now deceased, who said his job was “corporate 
gadfly.”  He had no direct reports but instead reported directly to the CEO for 
many years.  He traveled around this large corporation, noticing things and 
making connections between people who did not know each other but who 
could benefit by making contact. 
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promotes standardization, repetition, and doing things the same way every time.  
At low levels in the product system, or on a production line, this is essential.  But 
emergent behavior cannot be commanded to appear.  It must be discovered by 
continuous effort of everyone.  This effort should be considered successful even 
if some discoveries happen by accident.  Such lucky accidents have to be 
encouraged to appear.  
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